Holdups and overinvestment in capital markets

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.02.004MaRDI QIDQ402064zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors André Kurmann

Publication date 27 August 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

investmentbargainingholdup problemstrading frictions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mathematical economics (91B99)

Recommendations

• Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
• Holdup, search, and inefficiency
• Dynamic inefficiency in decentralized capital markets
• A dynamic theory of holdup.
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem

Cites work

• A Theory of the Firm with Non-binding Employment Contracts
• Does intrafirm bargaining matter in the large firm's matching model?
• Gross Credit Flows
• Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
• Liquidity in Asset Markets With Search Frictions
• Money and capital as competing media of exchange
• On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
• Over-the-Counter Markets
• Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade
• Search and the market for ideas
• Too much investment? A problem of endogenous outside options
• Trade dynamics in the market for federal funds

Cited in

(3)

• Frictional capital reallocation. I: Ex ante heterogeneity
• Dynamic inefficiency in decentralized capital markets
• Holdup, search, and inefficiency

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