The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R and D Policy in Battles for Monopoly

DOI10.2307/2527143MaRDI QIDQ4031382zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kyle Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger

Publication date 1 April 1993

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2527143

zbMATH Keywords

export marketsR{\&}D competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

• Foreign Technology, Spillovers, and R & D Policy
• Subsidies in an R\&D growth model with elastic labor
• International asymmetric R\&D rivalry and industrial strategy
• Market structure and endogenous productivity growth: how do R\& D subsidies affect market structure?
• R\&D subsidies and foreign direct investment

Cited in

(5)

• Robust policy schemes for differential R\&D games with asymmetric information
• International asymmetric R\&D rivalry and industrial strategy
• Optimal taxation and R\&D policies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2209542 (Why is no real title available?)
• R\&D and subsidy policy with imperfect project classification

This page was built for publication: The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R and D Policy in Battles for Monopoly

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4031382)