A new approach for bounding awards in bankruptcy problems
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Publication:404776
DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0789-0zbMATH Open1297.91095OpenAlexW1990163717MaRDI QIDQ404776FDOQ404776
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, M. Carmen Marco-Gil
Publication date: 4 September 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/182719
Cites Work
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- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
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- The Nash bargaining solution is optimal
- The Talmud rule and the securement of agents' awards.
- Sustainability in bankruptcy problems.
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- A noncooperative justification for egalitarian surplus sharing
- Bankruptcy games and the Ibn Ezra's proposal
- Lower bounds and recursive methods for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims
- A new solution to the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims
Cited In (7)
- Integer solutions to bankruptcy problems with non-integer claims
- Resource allocations with guaranteed awards in claims problems
- A bankruptcy approach to the core cover
- Updating claims in bankruptcy problems
- Compromising in bifocal distribution games: the average value
- The constrained equal awards rule for bankruptcy problems with a priori unions
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
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