Imperfect evaluation in project screening

DOI10.1007/S00712-013-0334-8zbMATH Open1294.91034OpenAlexW2056311907MaRDI QIDQ404960FDOQ404960

Authors: Andrei Barbos 

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40847/1/MPRA_paper_40847.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

evaluationproject screeningregulatory burden

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Subjective performance and the value of blind evaluation
• ``Tell me what you need: signaling with limited resources
• Project screening with tiered evaluation

Cited In (4)

• Project screening with tiered evaluation
• A model of project evaluation with limited attention
• Subjective performance and the value of blind evaluation
• External Audit System of Project Evaluation: Optimal Structure and Audit Quality

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