Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.07.017zbMATH Open1296.91027OpenAlexW3122868545MaRDI QIDQ405534FDOQ405534

Authors: Takuo Sugaya, Satoru Takahashi 

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.017

Recommendations

• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Instability of belief-free equilibria
• How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?^*
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessrepeated gameglobal gamealmost-public monitoringbelief-free equilibriumprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?^*
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games
• A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
• A foundation for Markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory
• Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
• On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication

Cited In (8)

• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
• Repetition, communication, and coordination failure
• Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
• On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
• Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
• Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents
• Instability of belief-free equilibria

This page was built for publication: Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q405534)