Eliciting information from a committee
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Publication:405544
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.04.008zbMATH Open1296.91138OpenAlexW2005821969MaRDI QIDQ405544FDOQ405544
Authors: Andriy Zapechelnyuk 
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97357
Recommendations
- Information acquisition in committees
- Information acquisition and transparency in committees
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- On Forming Committees
- Consensus reaching in committees
- Mechanisms for information elicitation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898602
- Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
- Collecting information to improve decision-making
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- The bargaining problem
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Bargaining and Value
- Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- A model of expertise
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games
- Multilateral Bargaining
- A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions
- Optimal Delegation
- Veto-based delegation
- Stability and the Nash solution
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- Decision rules revealing commonly known events
- OPTIMAL ARBITRATION
Cited In (3)
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