Eliciting information from a committee
From MaRDI portal
Publication:405544
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.008zbMath1296.91138MaRDI QIDQ405544
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97357
communication; collusion; multidimensional mechanism design; axiomatic bargaining; closed rule; experts
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B44: Economics of information
Related Items
Cites Work
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