Gödel's Second incompleteness theorem for Q
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Publication:4093419
Cited in
(18)- The paradox of the knower revisited
- 2000 European Summer Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic. Logic Colloquium 2000. La Sorbonne, Paris, France, July 23-31, 2000
- ON THE INVARIANCE OF GÖDEL’S SECOND THEOREM WITH REGARD TO NUMBERINGS
- On \(\mathsf{Q}\)
- How to extend the semantic tableaux and cut-free versions of the second incompleteness theorem almost to Robinson's arithmetic q
- Current research on Gödel's incompleteness theorems
- Some specially formulated axiomizations for \(\mathrm{I}\Sigma _0\) manage to evade the Herbrandized version of the second incompleteness theorem
- Self-verifying axiom systems, the incompleteness theorem and related reflection principles
- Passive induction and a solution to a Paris-Wilkie open question
- Montague's paradox, informal provability, and explicit modal logic
- Predicative logic and formal arithmetic
- The axiom system \(\mathrm{I}\Sigma_{0}\) manages to simultaneously obey and evade the Herbrandized version of the second incompleteness theorem
- Overspill and fragments of arithmetic
- A generalization of the second incompleteness theorem and some exceptions to it
- Cuts, consistency statements and interpretations
- New formally undecidable propositions: Non-trivial lower bounds on proof complexity and related theorems
- On the available partial respects in which an axiomatization for real valued arithmetic can recognize its consistency
- 2005 Summer Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic. Logic Colloquium '05
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