The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process

DOI10.2307/1913682zbMath0349.90153MaRDI QIDQ4120365

Jerry R. Green

Publication date: 1974

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ee23c0ead85f7aeb63ee31489bf663549a7d3105

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B60: Trade models

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