Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
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Publication:4142947
DOI10.2307/1911219zbMath0366.90021MaRDI QIDQ4142947
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry R. Green
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/14919/1/Laffont_14919.pdf
91B06: Decision theory
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B60: Trade models
91B18: Public goods
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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