Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.008zbMATH Open1258.91032OpenAlexW1983714462MaRDI QIDQ417628FDOQ417628

Sebastian Kranz, Susanne Goldlücke

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.008

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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescomputational methodsimperfect public monitoringmonetary transfers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08)

Cites Work

• Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• Strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibria in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and discounting
• International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
• Computing Supergame Equilibria
• The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
• Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams
• Multiparametric Linear Programming
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment

Cited In (11)

• Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
• Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality
• MORAL HAZARD IN REMOTE TEAMS
• Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers
• Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels
• Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts
• Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Even up: maintaining relationships
• Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
• Partnerships based on joint ownership

Uses Software

• R
• repgames

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