Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
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Publication:4198284
DOI10.2307/1911954zbMath0411.90004OpenAlexW1987699207WikidataQ29036461 ScholiaQ29036461MaRDI QIDQ4198284
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b12ba19a04bb682ba32faf724e3f4eabee62608a
convex domainsmanipulationpreference analysissmoothly connected domainsGroves' schemerestricted domains of profilesunigueness
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