Effects of individual decision theory assumptions on predictions of cooperation in social dilemmas
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Publication:4229259
DOI10.1080/0022250X.1998.9990217zbMATH Open0918.92030OpenAlexW2137275721MaRDI QIDQ4229259FDOQ4229259
Authors: Marcel van Assen 
Publication date: 7 July 1999
Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1998.9990217
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Cites Work
- Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Eliciting von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities When Probabilities Are Distorted or Unknown
- Violations of the betweenness axiom and nonlinearity in probability
- State of the Art—Utility Assessment Methods
- Gains, losses, and cooperation in social dilemmas and collective action: The effects of risk preferences
Cited In (5)
- How do social norms and expectations about others influence individual behavior? A quantum model of self/other-perspective interaction in strategic decision-making
- Social preferences, positive expectations, and trust based cooperation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Behavior in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Shifted Outcomes Analyzed with a Statistical Learning Model
- Cooperating over losses and competing over gains: a social dilemma experiment
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