A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.008zbMath1237.91091OpenAlexW2141663426MaRDI QIDQ423077

Stefan Napel, Nicola Friederike Maaser

Publication date: 18 May 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.008

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (4)

Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule ⋮ Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations ⋮ Heuristic and exact solutions to the inverse power index problem for small voting bodies ⋮ Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit

Cites Work

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• Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
• Equal representation in two-tier voting systems
• Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox
• Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
• The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
• Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule
• Robust asymptotic statistics
• The mathematics and statistics of voting power
• The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
• Welfarist evaluations of decision rules for boards of representatives

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