Let them cheat!
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Publication:423773
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.01.001zbMath1245.91017WikidataQ59972716 ScholiaQ59972716MaRDI QIDQ423773
Rodrigo A. Velez, William Thomson
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.01.001
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B18: Public goods
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market, Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
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