Learning by Doing, Precommitment and Infant-Industry Promotion

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00094zbMATH Open0948.91044OpenAlexW2125182053WikidataQ59583340 ScholiaQ59583340MaRDI QIDQ4262881FDOQ4262881

Authors: Dermot Leahy, J. Peter Neary 

Publication date: 4 June 2000

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00094

Recommendations

• Strategic Export Promotion in the Absence of Government Precommitment
• Nurturing an infant industry by Markovian subsidy schemes
• Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly
• Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy
• Multi-stage strategic trade policy in a differentiated duopoly

zbMATH Keywords

precommitmentstrategic behaviourtwo-period Cournot oligopoly game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Trade models (91B60)

Cited In (5)

• Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy
• Endogenous learning and trade policy
• Strategic Export Promotion in the Absence of Government Precommitment
• Pareto gains from trade: a dynamic counterexample
• Short-run policy commitment when investment timing is endogenous: 'more harm than good?'

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