Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
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Publication:4264321
DOI10.1162/003355398555496zbMath0944.91030MaRDI QIDQ4264321
Oliver D. Hart, John Hardman Moore
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555496
91G80: Financial applications of other theories
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