Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods

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Publication:4301280


DOI10.2307/2297983zbMath0807.90040MaRDI QIDQ4301280

Hervé Moulin

Publication date: 21 July 1994

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297983


91B18: Public goods


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