Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods

DOI10.2307/2297983zbMATH Open0807.90040OpenAlexW2074418535MaRDI QIDQ4301280FDOQ4301280

Authors: Hervé Moulin 

Publication date: 21 July 1994

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297983

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zbMATH Keywords

voluntary participationpublic goodmechanismstrategy-proofanonymousfree-rider problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Cited In (65)

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• Financial collapse: a lesson from the great depression.
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• Coordinating monetary contributions in participatory budgeting
• A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems
• Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing
• Rawlsian pricing of access to public facilities: a unidimensional illustration
• Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
• Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good.
• Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
• Efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities
• On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
• Sharing sequential values in a network
• Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule
• Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• Strategy-proof allocation of fixed costs
• Heterogeneous cost sharing, the directional serial rule
• Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: General cost functions
• Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
• Bayesian serial cost sharing
• Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
• Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good
• Choosing and sharing
• Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
• Cooperative production and efficiency
• Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
• The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
• The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
• On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
• Serial cost sharing methods for multi-commodity situations
• Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
• Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
• Public goods provision: unit-by-unit cost-sharing rules and the core
• Equitable nonlinear price regulation: An alternative approach to serial cost sharing
• Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
• Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
• Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
• Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
• Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
• The minimal overlap rule revisited
• Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good
• Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry
• Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
• Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
• On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
• Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
• Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units
• Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.
• Cost sharing in production economies
• Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
• Influence in private-goods allocation
• A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
• ``Almost subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting
• Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games
• Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
• Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good
• A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good
• Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness
• Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments
• Proposing a method for fixed cost allocation using DEA based on the efficiency invariance and common set of weights principles

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