The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
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Publication:4302553
DOI10.2307/2951739zbMath0864.90141MaRDI QIDQ4302553
Lones Smith, Prajit K. Dutta, Dilip Abreu
Publication date: 22 June 1997
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951739
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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