Conditioning and Intervening

DOI10.1093/bjps/45.4.1001zbMath0813.62003OpenAlexW2154347310MaRDI QIDQ4322415

Clark Glymour, Christopher Meek

Publication date: 6 June 1995

Published in: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/45.4.1001

zbMATH Keywords

decisionconditioningdirected graphscausationMarkov conditioninquirycausal knowledgeinterveningNewcomb-like problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Philosophy of mathematics (00A30)

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