Marriage and Class
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4351425
DOI10.1162/003355397555154zbMath0881.90026MaRDI QIDQ4351425
Publication date: 6 October 1997
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/391968cb67acd4f7cbfab288cc978bae37377a17
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