Moral Hazard in Corporate Investment and the Disciplinary Role of Voluntary Capital Rationing

DOI10.1287/MNSC.43.6.737zbMath0889.90099OpenAlexW2089485227MaRDI QIDQ4356620

Guochang Zhang

Publication date: 4 June 1998

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.6.737

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agentNPVcapital rationingrenegotiation-proofhigh hurdle rate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Related Items (1)

Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach

This page was built for publication: Moral Hazard in Corporate Investment and the Disciplinary Role of Voluntary Capital Rationing