The Equality of the Core and the Set of Equilibria in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities and a Continuum of Agents

DOI10.2307/2525928zbMath0275.90007OpenAlexW2021898836MaRDI QIDQ4401202

Truman F. Bewley

Publication date: 1973

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2525928

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Trade models (91B60)

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