Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys

DOI10.1007/3-540-36288-6_16MaRDI QIDQ4414710zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Adrian Antipa, Daniel R. L. Brown, René Struik, Scott A. Vanstone, Alfred Menezes

Publication date 27 July 2003

Published in Public Key Cryptography — PKC 2003 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36288-6_16

zbMATH Keywords

public-key encryptionelliptic curve key

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Applications to coding theory and cryptography of arithmetic geometry (14G50)

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Cited in

(13)

• EPG-representations with Small Grid-Size
• Provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol
• Fault-injection attacks against NIST's post-quantum cryptography round 3 KEM candidates
• Protecting ECC against fault attacks: the ring extension method revisited
• Guest editorial: Special issue in honor of Scott A. Vanstone
• Breaking the Bluetooth pairing -- the fixed coordinate invalid curve attack
• Another look at HMQV
• Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS
• Fault-based attack on Montgomery's ladder algorithm
• Practical realisation and elimination of an ECC-related software bug attack
• Practical invalid curve attacks on TLS-ECDH
• Lattice-based fault attacks against ECMQV
• Designing efficient authenticated key exchange resilient to leakage of ephemeral secret keys

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