Faint laser quantum key distribution: eavesdropping exploiting multiphoton pulses

DOI10.1080/09500340110076437zbMATH Open1047.81505OpenAlexW4250822285WikidataQ59474057 ScholiaQ59474057MaRDI QIDQ4433016FDOQ4433016

Authors Stéphane Félix, Nicolas Gisin, A. Stefanov, H. Zbinden

Publication date 15 December 2003

Published in Journal of Modern Optics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0102062

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Quantum computation (81P68)

Abstract: The technological possibilities of a realistic eavesdropper are discussed. Two eavesdropping strategies taking profit of multiphoton pulses in faint laser QKD are presented. We conclude that, as long as storage of Qubits is technically impossible, faint laser QKD is not limited by this security issue, but mostly by the detector noise.

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