Algebraic Semantics for Paraconsistent Nelson's Logic
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Publication:4434609
DOI10.1093/logcom/13.4.453zbMath1034.03029OpenAlexW2039232530MaRDI QIDQ4434609
Publication date: 10 November 2003
Published in: Journal of Logic and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/13.4.453
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