Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria
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Publication:4446340
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00240zbMath1064.91008MaRDI QIDQ4446340
Publication date: 2003
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00240
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