Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.08.003MaRDI QIDQ449038zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Davide P. Cervone, Ronghua Dai, Daniel Gnoutcheff, Grant Lanterman, Ari Morse, William S. Zwicker, Nikhil Srivastava, Andrew Mackenzie

Publication date 11 September 2012

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.08.003

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules
• A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule
• A note on Fermat's problem
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures
• Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
• Choosing from a tournament
• Condorcet’s Paradox
• Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
• Geometry of voting
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• Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
• Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
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• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
• One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity
• The Fermat-Weber location problem revisited
• The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory
• The voters' paradox, spin, and the Borda count
• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
• Weber's problem and weiszfeld's algorithm in general spaces
• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

Cited in

(9)

• Polarization in networks: identification-alienation framework
• Generalized medians and a political center
• Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules
• The geometry of voting power: weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids
• A spatial analogue of May's theorem
• A spatial analogue of May's theorem
• The pleasures of friends
• An extension of May's theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting
• Spatial implementation

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• AS 78

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