DISCOUNT FACTORS AND THRESHOLDS: FOREIGN INVESTMENT WHEN ENFORCEMENT IS IMPERFECT

DOI10.1017/S1365100500014012MaRDI QIDQ4496473zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Elizabeth Asiedu, Anne P. Villamil

Publication date 14 August 2000

Published in Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100500014012

zbMATH Keywords

discount factorforeign investmentintertemporal enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

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