Conditionals Are Not Truth-Functional: An Argument from Peirce

DOI10.2307/3328874zbMath0943.03548OpenAlexW4245706929MaRDI QIDQ4497652

Stephen Read

Publication date: 22 August 2000

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/3328874

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (4)

Peirce's diagrammatic solutions to `Peirce's puzzle' ⋮ The pragmatic dimension of indefinites ⋮ When is a schema not a schema? On a remark by Suszko ⋮ Harmony and autonomy in classical logic

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