Conditionals Are Not Truth-Functional: An Argument from Peirce

DOI10.2307/3328874MaRDI QIDQ4497652zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stephen Read

Publication date 22 August 2000

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/3328874

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Cited in

(4)

• Peirce's diagrammatic solutions to `Peirce's puzzle'
• Harmony and autonomy in classical logic
• The pragmatic dimension of indefinites
• When is a schema not a schema? On a remark by Suszko

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