Conditionals Are Not Truth-Functional: An Argument from Peirce

DOI10.2307/3328874zbMATH Open0943.03548OpenAlexW4245706929MaRDI QIDQ4497652FDOQ4497652

Stephen Read

Publication date: 22 August 2000

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/3328874

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Cited In (4)

• The pragmatic dimension of indefinites
• Harmony and autonomy in classical logic
• Peirce's diagrammatic solutions to `Peirce's puzzle'
• When is a schema not a schema? On a remark by Suszko

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