Uniqueness, Stability, and Comparative Statics in Rationalizable Walrasian Markets

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00172MaRDI QIDQ4530996zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald J. Brown, Chris Shannon

Publication date 28 May 2002

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d11/d1170.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Cited in

(15)

• Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: Testable restrictions and identification.
• Testable implications of general equilibrium theory: A differentiable approach.
• Rationalizing allocation data -- a nonparametric Walrasian theory when prices are absent or non-Walrasian
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for weak separability problem for homogeneous utility functions
• Comparative statics and heterogeneity
• Revealed preference tests for weak separability: an integer programming approach
• Identification of Pareto-improving policies: Information as the real invisible hand
• A new approach to the uniqueness of equilibrium with CRRA preferences
• Revealed preference tests for consistency with weakly separable indirect utility
• Revealed preference and revealed preference cycles: a survey
• Empirical welfare economics
• Heuristics for deciding collectively rational consumption behavior
• Coarse revealed preference
• Local sunspot equilibria reconsidered
• An Afriat theorem for the collective model of household consumption

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