Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
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Publication:4531028
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00228zbMath1026.91034MaRDI QIDQ4531028
Matthew O. Jackson, Michel Le Breton, Bhaskar Dutta
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00228
91B12: Voting theory
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