Relative consumption and majority voting: supplementing Oates' ``decentralization theorem

DOI10.1007/S00712-011-0251-7MaRDI QIDQ453450zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Inga Hillesheim

Publication date 27 September 2012

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0251-7

zbMATH Keywords

median voterlocal public goodsfederalismrelative consumption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• The political economy of (de)centralization with complementary public goods
• The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers
• Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization
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Cites work

• Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization
• Microeconomic theory

Cited in

(8)

• Inefficiencies from metropolitan political and fiscal decentralization: failures of tiebout competition
• Decentralized fiscal federalism revisited: optimal income taxation and public goods under horizontal leadership
• The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers
• Peripheral diversity: transfers versus public goods
• Uniformity requirement and political accountability
• Voting over redistribution in the Meltzer-Richard model under interdependent labor inputs
• Citizen preferences and the architecture of government
• The political economy of (de)centralization with complementary public goods

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