Prose versus Proof: Wittgenstein on Godel, Tarski and Truth

DOI10.1093/philmat/9.3.280zbMath1005.03005OpenAlexW2134796162MaRDI QIDQ4542721

Juliet Floyd

Publication date: 15 October 2002

Published in: Philosophia Mathematica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/9.3.280

zbMATH Keywords

Gödel's first incompleteness theoremmathematical truth

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) History of mathematics in the 20th century (01A60) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) History of mathematical logic and foundations (03-03)

Related Items (6)

Prolegomena to virtue-theoretic studies in the philosophy of mathematics ⋮ Steiner’s Wittgenstein ⋮ Parikh and Wittgenstein ⋮ Philosophical pictures about mathematics: Wittgenstein and contradiction ⋮ Truth in the \textit{investigations} ⋮ Wittgenstein’s Diagonal Argument: A Variation on Cantor and Turing

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