Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules
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Publication:4549682
DOI10.1162/003355302753650319zbMath1035.91052OpenAlexW2155143309MaRDI QIDQ4549682
Maurice Obstfeld, Kenneth S. Rogoff
Publication date: 31 October 2002
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6412m5b7
closed-form solutionsolving explicitly for expected utilitytwo-country sticky-wage modelwage and price setting
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