Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking, Innovation, and Patent-Race Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_17zbMath1417.91021OpenAlexW2465627355MaRDI QIDQ4555518

Takeshi Yamazaki, Noriaki Matsushima

Publication date: 20 November 2018

Published in: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_17

zbMATH Keywords

marginal costunit production costcost differenceinvestment incentiveinvestment level

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (1)

Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness: At 0 Discontinuous Industry Revenue and Decreasing Price Flexibility

Cites Work

• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• The specification of the probability functions in Tullock's rent-seeking contest
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• Contest success functions
• Market Structure and Innovation

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