Bank regulation when both deposit rate control and capital requirements are socially costly

DOI10.1111/IJET.12150MaRDI QIDQ4556035zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carsten Krabbe Nielsen, Gerd Weinrich

Publication date 23 November 2018

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10807/28677

zbMATH Keywords

banking regulationcapital requirementdeposit rate controlmoral hazardSalop model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

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• Bank capital, fire sales, and the social value of deposits
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• When should bank regulation favor the wealthy?
• Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and narrow banking
• Why do banks require minimum balance to avoid a fee?

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