Finding all pure-strategy equilibria in games with continuous strategies

DOI10.3982/QE165MaRDI QIDQ4559977zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kenneth L. Judd, Philipp Renner, Karl Schmedders

Publication date 4 December 2018

Published in Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriadynamic gamespolynomial equationsBertrand gameMarkov-perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Dynamic games (91A25) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cited in

(4)

• Existence of a strategy with piecewise-constant realizations
• Graphical criteria for positive solutions to linear systems
• Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies

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