Bilevel programming approaches to the computation of optimistic and pessimistic single-leader-multi-follower equilibria
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Publication:4580191
DOI10.4230/LIPICS.SEA.2017.31zbMATH Open1436.91018OpenAlexW2753202239MaRDI QIDQ4580191FDOQ4580191
Authors: Nicola Basilico, S. Coniglio, Nicola Gatti, Alberto Marchesi 
Publication date: 13 August 2018
Full work available at URL: https://air.unimi.it/handle/2434/526984
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Nonconvex programming, global optimization (90C26) Mixed integer programming (90C11) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)
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- Leadership in singleton congestion games: what is hard and what is easy
- Computing a pessimistic Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple followers: the mixed-pure case
- A new combinatorial branch-and-bound algorithm for the knapsack problem with conflicts
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