Bilevel Programming Approaches to the Computation of Optimistic and Pessimistic Single-Leader-Multi-Follower Equilibria.

DOI10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2017.31zbMath1436.91018OpenAlexW2753202239MaRDI QIDQ4580191

Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti, Stefano Coniglio, Nicola Basilico

Publication date: 13 August 2018

Full work available at URL: https://air.unimi.it/handle/2434/526984

game theory branch-and-bound Nash equilibria Stackelberg games bilevel and nonlinear programming

Mixed integer programming (90C11) Nonconvex programming, global optimization (90C26) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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