Formation and long‐run stability of cooperative groups in a social dilemma situation

DOI10.1111/IJET.12056MaRDI QIDQ4584748zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Toshimasa Maruta, Akira Okada

Publication date 4 September 2018

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12056

zbMATH Keywords

adaptive playcooperationevolutiongroup formationhawk-dove gamesocial dilemmastochastic stabilityvoluntary participation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24) Experimental studies (91A90)

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