Health insurance, market power, and social welfare
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Recommendations
- Health care reform, efficiency of health insurers, and optimal health insurance markets
- Social insurance, private health insurance and individual welfare
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- The Theory of Social Health Insurance
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- Competition and quality in health care markets
- Optimal health insurance and trade-off between health and wealth
- An Equilibrium Model of Health Insurance Provision and Wage Determination
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(17)- Budget effects of health care `vouchers'
- Risk ajdustment for health insurance: Theory and implications
- Mixed provision of health care services with double coverage
- Social insurance, private health insurance and individual welfare
- Health insurance reform: the impact of a medicare buy-in
- Are invisible hands good hands in health care markets? Extension
- Winners and losers of universal health insurance: a macroeconomic analysis
- Social health insurance: a quantitative exploration
- On discrimination in health insurance
- Household search and health insurance coverage
- Externalities and benefit design in health insurance
- The theory of social health insurance.
- Insurance markets and unisex tariffs: is the European court of justice improving or destroying welfare?
- Facilitating consumer learning in insurance markets: what are the welfare effects?
- National Healthcare System and Economy’s Competitiveness
- An Equilibrium Model of Health Insurance Provision and Wage Determination
- Legal cost insurance and social welfare
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