Four ways from universal to particular: how Chomsky's principles-and-parameters model is not selectionist

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Publication:4586162

DOI10.1080/11663081.2016.1214803zbMATH Open1398.03053arXiv1410.4501OpenAlexW2509483680MaRDI QIDQ4586162FDOQ4586162


Authors: David P. Ellerman Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 12 September 2018

Published in: Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Following the development of the selectionist theory of the immune system, there was an attempt to characterize many biological mechanisms as being "selectionist" as juxtaposed to "instructionist." But this broad definition would group Darwinian evolution, the immune system, embryonic development, and Chomsky's language-acquisition mechanism as all being "selectionist." Yet Chomsky's mechanism (and embryonic development) are significantly different from the selectionist mechanisms of biological evolution or the immune system. Surprisingly, there is an abstract way using two dual mathematical logics to make the distinction between genuinely selectionist mechanisms and what are better called "generative" mechanisms. This note outlines that distinction.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1410.4501




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