Physicians' financial incentives and treatment choices in heart attack management

DOI10.3982/QE365MaRDI QIDQ4586196zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Dominic Coey

Publication date 12 September 2018

Published in Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

zbMATH Keywords

health insurancefree-for-service paymentsheart attack managementphysician incentivesphysician treatment choices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to actuarial sciences and financial mathematics (62P05)

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• Haste or waste? Peer pressure and productivity in the emergency department
• Diagnosing Physician error: a machine learning approach to low-value health care
• EFFICIENT LIABILITY IN EXPERT MARKETS
• Data-driven incentive design in the medicare shared savings program
• A Denial a Day Keeps the Doctor Away

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