Do siblings free-ride in ``being there for parents?

DOI10.3982/QE389MaRDI QIDQ4586313zbMATHFDO

Authors Shiko Maruyama, Meliyanni Johar

Publication date 12 September 2018

Published in Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

first-mover advantageprisoner's dilemmapublic goodsfree-ridingempirical gameinformal caresequential participation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Public goods (91B18)

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Cited in

(1)

• Why do children take care of their elderly parents? are the Japanese any different?

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