On the prisoner's dilemma in R\&D with input spillovers and incentives for R\&D cooperation

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.05.004zbMath1296.91175OpenAlexW2058468223MaRDI QIDQ459389

Anna Stepanova, Malgorzata Knauff, Chrystie Burr

Publication date: 8 October 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.05.004

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (6)

Complex dynamics analysis for a two-stage Cournot duopoly game of semi-collusion in production ⋮ Stability analysis of R\&D cooperation in a supply chain ⋮ A COMMENT ON A MODEL WITH R&D SPILLOVER AND PRICE COMPETITION ⋮ Endogenous heterogeneity in duopoly with deterministic one-way spillovers ⋮ The R\&D investment decision game with product differentiation ⋮ Bifurcation, global dynamics and synchronization in a Bertrand game with R&D spillover and semi-collusion

Cites Work

• Spillovers, appropriability, and R\&D
• Dynamic efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand competition: input versus output spillovers
• Noncooperative versus cooperative R\&D with endogenous spillover rates

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