Cost allocation for horizontal carrier coalitions based on approximated Shapley values

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-42902-1_18MaRDI QIDQ4596205zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kristian Schopka, Herbert Kopfer

Publication date 1 December 2017

Published in Operations Research Proceedings (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42902-1_18

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06)

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Cited in

(7)

• Horizontal cooperation among freight carriers: request allocation and profit sharing
• A Bayesian Monte Carlo method for computing the Shapley value: application to weighted voting and bin packing games
• Analysing the effect of partner characteristics on the performance of horizontal carrier collaborations
• Approximate nucleolus-based revenue sharing in airline alliances
• Stable allocations for choice-based collaborative price setting
• A study of proxies for Shapley allocations of transport costs
• An Application of the Aumann-Shapley Prices for Cost Allocation in Transportation Problems

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