Governance mechanism for global greenhouse gas emissions: a stochastic differential game approach
Summary: Today developed and developing countries have to admit the fact that global warming is affecting the earth, but the fundamental problem of how to divide up necessary greenhouse gas reductions between developed and developing countries remains. In this paper, we propose cooperative and noncooperative stochastic differential game models to describe greenhouse gas emissions decision makings of developed and developing countries, calculate their feedback Nash equilibrium and the Pareto optimal solution, characterize parameter spaces that developed and developing countries can cooperate, design cooperative conditions under which participants buy the cooperative payoff, and distribute the cooperative payoff with Nash bargaining solution. Lastly, numerical simulations are employed to illustrate the above results.
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