A Duopoly with Common Renewable Resource and Incentives

DOI10.1142/S0219198917500189zbMath1391.91120OpenAlexW2726810119MaRDI QIDQ4602182

Michele Bisceglia, Luca Grilli

Publication date: 9 January 2018

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198917500189

zbMATH Keywords

duopoly modelincentivesresource extractionfeedback Nash equilibriumfinite time horizonopen loop Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

Existence of Unique Equilibrium in Cournot Mixed Oligopoly ⋮ Optimal taxation in a common resource oligopoly game ⋮ A dynamic private property resource game with asymmetric firms

Cites Work

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• Quality competition with motivated providers and sluggish demand
• On the Markovian efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
• Turnpike Properties in a Finite-Horizon Differential Game: Dynamic Duopoly with Sticky Prices
• Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
• On the Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: Cournot vs Bertrand

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