Optimal Award Scheme in Innovation Tournaments

DOI10.1287/opre.2016.1575zbMath1407.91123OpenAlexW3122674591MaRDI QIDQ4604903

Ersin Körpeoğlu, Laurence Ales, Soo-Haeng Cho

Publication date: 6 March 2018

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1492916/

zbMATH Keywords

tournamentinnovationresearch and developmentgames/group decisions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

The efficacy of tournament designs ⋮ Parallel Innovation Contests ⋮ Multiplicative output form and its applications to problems in the homogenous innovation contest model ⋮ Innovation contests with risk‐averse participants ⋮ Crowdsourcing contests with entry cost ⋮ Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests ⋮ On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result ⋮ Designing Dynamic Contests ⋮ Tournament rewards and heavy tails ⋮ Award scheme in random trial contests ⋮ Does an increase in the number of solvers benefit the seeker in heterogeneous contests? ⋮ Crowdsourcing contests

Uses Software

• BayesDA

Cites Work

• R\&D outsourcing in an innovation-driven supply chain

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