Computing equilibria in markets with budget-additive utilities
DOI10.4230/LIPICS.ESA.2016.8zbMATH Open1397.91242arXiv1603.07210MaRDI QIDQ4606277FDOQ4606277
Authors: Xiaohui Bei, Jugal Garg, Martin Hoefer, K. Mehlhorn
Publication date: 2 March 2018
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1603.07210
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