Policy influence and private returns from lobbying in the energy sector

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDV029MaRDI QIDQ4610771zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Karam Kang

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv029

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay contestsenergy policieslobbying

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) History, political science (91F10)

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(6)

• Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: theory and evidence.
• Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections
• When the weak win: the role of investment in environmental lobbying
• Follow the money
• Nonparametric identification and estimation of all-pay auction and contest models
• The equilibrium effects of campaign finance deregulation on U.S. elections

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